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should stop the Court from scrutinizing officials through the expeditious prerogative writs, in addition to appeals on the merits.
The writer does not pretend to have supplied the Immigration
authorities with an all-embracing panacea, but has offered only a
few suggested amendments. Immigration policy is replete with social,
political, emotional and economic problems that resist solution by a
few strokes of the legislative pen. It is submitted, however, that by
adoption of these proposals Canada's immigration policy may be
made to embody the basic tenets of democracy to which we profess
to adhere.
ALLEN M. LINDEN*

SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONTROL OF THE POLICE BY THE
COURTS The powers and duties of the police are not to be found
completely stated in any separate Act. Basically, each municipality
is responsible for maintaining an adequate police force. 1 The Criminal
Code, the Police Act, the Liquor Control Act, the Highway Traffic
Act, and various other Acts contain provision empowering the police
to enforce regulations made in them. Section 47 of the Police Act
broadly states that:
"the members of police forces ... are charged with the duty of preserv.
ing the peace ... apprehending offenders .... and aiding in the prose-

cuting of offenders, and have generally all the powers and privileges and
are liable to all the duties and responsibilities that belong to constables".

In carrying out these functions the police are an administrative
body, since, at least in theory, they do not finally determine the guilt
of an accused. 2 Every administrative body, to be effective, must be
given sufficient power to carry out its tasks. At the same time, controls must be imposed on such a body to prevent any abuses of the
powers given to it. The police are in such a position that, if they
should exceed their authorized powers, serious injury may result to
an individual.
This note discusses the nature and extent of the power to arrest
and to gather the evidence necessary to prosecute; secondly, the controls our legal system has imposed on the exercise of this power;
and finally, the remedies available to an aggrieved individual.
There are two conflicting interests affected by the power to arrest. An individual has an interest in the freedom of his person. This
*Mr. Linden is a member of the Ontario Bar, currently doing graduate study
in law at the University of California at Berkeley. This paper was prepared
as part of the requirements for a course in International Law at the Osgoode
Hall Law School in 1960.
1 The Police Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 298, s. 2. For the jurisdiction and constitutions of the Ontario Provincial Police, see this Act s. 3, and Part IV.
2As organs of inquiry into crime, administrative bodies have evolved
into judicial bodies. See Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England, (New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1958).
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interest has been jealously guarded by our courts. At the same time,
the community has an interest in being protected from criminals.
The power to arrest without warrant as provided by section 435
of the Criminal Code is an attempt to maintain a balance between
these two interests. It provides that:
"A peace officer may arrest without warrant
(a) a person who has committed or who, on reasonable and probable
grounds, he believes has committed or is about to commit an kndictable
offence, or
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence".
Both subsections of section 435 involve an element of judgment on the
part of the police officer effecting the arrest. However, subsection (b)
presents no great danger of abuse since a person actually found committing an offence is unlikely to dispute an officer's right to arrest
him. A greater problem arises in the interpretation of subsection (a).
What is the nature of the test to be applied in determining whether
the grounds for arrest are "reasonable and probable" in any given set
of circumstances? And, once this test is determined, who is to
apply it, the arresting officer, a judge, or a jury? These questions
3
were dealt with recently by Schroeder J.A. in Kennedy v. Tomlinon.
There it was held that the test was not subjective that is, what the
officer himself thought were reasonable and probable grounds, but
rather whether the facts relied on would create a reasonable suspicion
in the mind of a reasonable man. 4
Furthermore, the question whether, on the facts, the officer
acted with reasonable and probable cause is for the judge to decide.
The only aspect for the jury is, that if there is any dispute on the
facts, then the jury is to determine the facts. But once the facts are
determined then it becomes a question of law for the judge. This in
itself provides an effective control against arbitrary arrest because
such arrest is subject to judicial review.
Since the use of force is essential to apprehend some criminals,
and since section 47 of the Police Act imposes a duty on the police to
apprehend criminals, obviously the law must recognize a defence of
justification in using force to carry out that duty where necessary.
The use of force is authorized by section 25(1) (b) of the Criminal
Code providing:
" ... a peace officer . . .is justified .. .in using as much force as is
necessary to prevent the escape by flight, unless the escape can be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner".
If a person takes flight to avoid arrest then section 25(4) is applicable, i.e.
3
4 (1960), 126 C.C.C. 175; 20 D.L.R. (2d) 273 (Ont., C.A.).
In Koechlin v. Waugh and Hamilton, [1957) O.W.N. 245; (1957), 118
C.C.C. 24, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the fact that the plaintiff's
companion was wearing "rubber-soled shoes and a windbreaker" fell short
of reasonable and probable grounds for believing that he had committed an
indictable offence or was about to do so.
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" . . . a peace officer . . . is justified . . . in using as much force as is

necessary to prevent the escape by flight, unless the escape can be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner".
Here again there is a question of interpretation because both of
these subsections use the words, "as much force as is necessary".
These words are a qualification on the amount of force that may be
used. The police are liable to an action for damages if the force used
is excessive under the circumstances. 5 "The jury should have been
instructed, also, that where the right of a peace officer to use force
exists it must be exercised in a reasonable manner; and that if it be
exercised in a negligent manner, a peace officer is liable for all loss
or damage caused by his negligence." 6
In a situation arising under section 25(4) there are really two
questions. First, did the circumstances necessitate the use of force?
Secondly, if the use of force was necessary, then was it excessive in
those circumstances? 7 These questions both fall to be determined by
the court. But a further question also arises in this situation. Is section 25(4) a statutory justification only in an action by the one
agaihst whom the force was used, or does it also apply to an innocent
third party who was injured? This problem was recently before the
Supreme Court of Canada in Priestmanv. Colangelo.8 In this case the
majority held that a police officer, in carrying out his duties under
section 47 of the Police Act, was protected by section 25 (4) not only
in an action by the fleeing criminal but also in an action by an innocent third party who was injured. This decision was based on the finding that the force used was not excessive. However, the dissenting
judgment of Cartwright and Martland, JJ. held that even if it is assumed that the officer was not negligent in using force, then he is still
not protected by section 25 (4) in an action against him by the innocent third party.9 Mr. Justice Locke, Taschereau J. concurring, disposed of this view by saying that such injury is damnum sine injuria
because a person's property and life must, in certain cases be sacrificed for the public good. 9 a It may be argued that if an individual must
suffer for the public good, why then, should not the public compensate
that individual for his loss? In the present case there was no recovery
from the police officer, and it is only remotely possible that a seventeen year old car thief would have sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment against him, thus leaving the third party in a most unsatisfactory position. Our modem theory of spreading the loss by insurance
5 The Police are not entitled to use force to determine a person's identity;
see Koechlin v. Waugi and Hamilton, supra footnote 4 approved in R. 'v.
Carroll,
[1960] O.W.N. 9.
6
R obertson. and Robertson v. Joyce, [1948] O.R. 696 at p. 706; O.W.N.
605; 92 C.C.C. 382; [1948] 4 D.L.R. 436 (Ont. C.A.) approved in Sbhynall v.
Smythson and Priestman, [1948] O.R. 7 at p. 22; 119 C.C.C. 241 at p. 254;
11 D.L.R. (2d) 301 at 315 (Ont. C.A.).
7 Shynall 'v. Priestman,suprafootnote 6.
8 [1959] S.C.R. 615; (1959), 124 C.C.C. 1; 19 D.L.R. (2d) 1.
9For a similar view see 1. v. Bandford et al., [1957] Ex. C.R. 210; (1957),
118 C.C.C. 93 (Ex. Ct.).
9a Fauteux J. agreed with the dissenting judgment of Laidlaw J.A. In the
Ontario Court of Appeal.
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would seem applicable to remedy this unfortunate situation. A policy
could be carried by the municipality or the police board to cover such
contingencies with a right to claim against the offending criminal.
This remedy, however, would be thwarted by the fact that our
courts hold that a police officer, although appointed by the municipality or the police board, is a servant of neither so that the law of
master and servant has no application in this field.' 0 The result is
that neither the municipality nor the police board is liable in damages
for the negligence of the police. Despite section 16(2) of the Police
Act which provides that: "Every member of the police of a municipality, however appointed, are.., subject to the government of the
board to the same extent as if appointed by the board", the courts
hold that if a person is carrying out a statutory duty (as in section
47 of the Police Act) then there is no application of the principle
1 1 Therefore, an
respondent superior.
injured person's only remedy is
against the officer who was negligent. At present, the only recovery
against the municipality arises when an officer is negligent in the
operation of a city owned vehicle and then recovery is by virtue of
section 105 (1) of the Highway Traffic Act,12 and not by the masterservant rules.
The present status of police officers could be altered by making
them statutory agents of the police board. The result would be, to
make the Board financially responsible for police acts, and inevitably
result in a greater degree of control over the police by the board. In
opposition to this, it will be argued that the police, knowing the board
would be liable for their negligence, might become more careless.
This could be deterred by a system whereby the offending officer
might be demoted in rank, fined, dismissed or penalized according
to internal regulations of the Board for involvement by police officers
in such liability creating activities.
In addition to this, the board could reserve the right to recover
from the officer any judgment paid by it in such cases as false imprisonment or malicious prosecution involving improper conduct by
the officer, but not in cases where an officer acted bona tide, nor in
border line cases such as the Shynall v. Priestman case.1 2 a It is further submitted that the bona tides of an officer's conduct should in
such cases be determined by the police board who could thereby exercise more stringent control over officers who might be inclined to
abuse their powers.
IORe A Reference Under the Constitutional Questions Act, [1957] O.R.
28 (Ont. C.A.); Myers and (heZpk v. Hoffman, [1955] O.R. 965; O.W.N. 987
(Ont. High Ct.); A.-G. for New South, Wales v. PerpetualTrustee (o., [1955]

A.C. 457; 2 W.L.R. 707; 1 All E.R. 846 (P.C.). For an interesting case finding a
game warden a servant of the Crown see, Long v. Province of N.B. (1960),
126 C.C.C. 83; 44 M.P.R. 12 (N.B. S.C.).
31 See Priestman v. Colangelo, supra footnote 8. For a general discussion of the liability of public servants see R. J. Gray, Private Wrongs of
Public Servants, California Law Review, (1959), vol. 47, No. 2 especially
regarding policemen at p. 328.
na R.S.O. 1960, c. 172.
121. v. Purvis (1929), 51 C.C.C. 273 (Ont.); see also Cr. Code s. 203(4).
12a Supra, footnote 6.
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Besides being liable in tort for excessive use of force, an officer
may be prosecuted under section 26 of the Criminal Code, which provides that:
"Everyone who is authorized by law to use force is criminally responsible
for any excess thereof12according to the nature and quality of the act of
constitutes the excess. This provision may
be a constant reminder to
the police that they are not above the law". 13
In addition to arresting without a warrant, an officer may arrest
on the authority of a warrant issued by a justice as a result of an
information being laid by any person who believes that an indictable
offence has been committed. 14 In this event the police do not act on
their own initiative but are merely officers of the court carrying out
its orders. For this reason an officer is not subject to tortious liability
as long as he executed the warrant in a reasonable manner and arrested the right person.' 5 But if the arrest was not justified in any
manner, and assuming the officer acted reasonably, then the aggrieved
person must seek his remedy against the person who laid the information, and not against the arresting officer. 16
A person who is being arrested is entitled to know the reason for
his arrest. Failure to inform him of the reason may constitute false
arrest and false imprisonment.17 This principle is applicable whether
the arrest is with or without warrant, as stated in section 29(2) of
the Criminal Code.j8 However, this general principle is subject to
some limitations as where a person is "caught in the act" or if he
takes flight so that it is impossible to inform him. The leading case
on this area of the law is Christie v. Lechinsky 19 which has been
adopted in a number of Ontario cases.2 0 Once a person has been arrested, he must be produced before a justice in a reasonable time as
is provided by section 438 of the Criminal Code. This section is not
only to protect the accused from being detained unreasonably, but it
also gives to the police (at least impliedly) some time and opportunity
to interrogate the accused and to gather the evidence necessary on
which to base the charge that will be laid against him.
Assuming that an arrest or imprisonment was unjustified, a
person has adequate remedies available to the extent that pecuniary
damages will compensate him for the injury suffered. Depending on
the circumstances, he can bring an action for false arrest, false im13 See generally Dicey, Law of the Constitution.
Cr. Code ss. 439-445.

14

15 Ibid.,

s. 28 (1).

16 Kennedy
17

. Tomlinson, supra footnote 3.

Garthus v. Van CaeseeZe (1959), 122 C.C.C. 369; 17 W.W.R. 431; 19
D.L.R. (2d) 157 (B.C. S.C.), where failure to inform of the reason for arrest

rendered the arrest illegal; Koechlin v. Waugh and Hamilton supra footnote
4, where failure to inform of the reason and taking into custody constituted
false imprisonment.
18 Ibid.

19 [1947] A.C. 573; see especially Lord Simonds at pp. 592-3; [1947] 1 All
E.R.2567 (H.L.).
o See cases cited in footnotes 16 and 17 supra: 1. 'v. Hurlen, [1959]
O.W.N. 31 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Carroll, [1960] O.W.N. 9 (Ont. C.A.).

Notes
prisonment, or malicious prosecution, or any combination of these
against the arresting officer or the person who laid the information.
As stated above, to justify an arrest the arresting officer must act
on reasonable and probable grounds. 21 The absence of such grounds
is the foundation of an action for false arrest. But actions for false
22
arrest often fail because in fact there has been no arrest made.
Voluntarily going to the police station with the officer at his request
does not constitute an arrest. However, if one goes apparently voluntarily with an officer really in order to prevent making a scene or
to prevent the necessity of actual force being used, this will constitute false imprisonment.23 The person arrested or detained must show
a restraint on his liberty against his will. But there may be a restraint
without actual force, or any threat of force as long as the circumstances show that if the person had attempted to leave then he would
have been restrained. Once a person establishes this, then the burden
of proof lies on the arresting officer to justify whatever action he took
24
in the circumstances.
However, in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff has
a much more difficult task in order to be successful. He must prove
that a prosecution was brought against him which was decided in his
favour, that it was instituted without reasonable or probable cause,
25
and that it was malicious.
The latter requirement, being a state of mind, is difficult to prove.
Lack of a reasonable cause may be evidence of a malicious spirit, but
a malicious spirit is essentially an ulterior or improper motive which
is not in the furtherance of justice. 26 Because of the difficulty in determining the conduct which will result in liability for false arrest,
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution these sections must be
tried by a jury unless the parties waive a jury trial. -7
One should also be mindful of the six month limitation period
contained in the Public Authorities ProtectionAct so that his action
will not fail on a procedural point.2 8 This Act applies to police officers
as well as to anyone acting under statutory authority.
A person who has been detained by the police has available to
him the writ of habeas corpus whereby the validity of his detention
2
3 Supra footnote 4; Lamb v. Benoit, [1959] S.C.R. 321; (1959), 123 C.C.C.
193; 217
2 D.L.R. (2d) 369 (S.C.C.).
For a borderline case of what constitutes an arrest see Kennedy v.
Tomlinson footnote 3 supra. Also see Garthus v. Van Caeseele, footnote 17
supra.
23
Conn v. David Spencer, Ltd., [1930] 1 D.L.R. 805; 1 W.W.R. 26 (B.C.

S.C.).24 For a general discussion of these principles see Kennedy v. Tomlinson,
suprafootnote 3.
25 Ibid.

26 Garthus v. Van Caeseele, supra footnote 17; generally see, Wright,
Cases on The Law of Torts, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Butterworths (Canada) Ltd.,
1958),27 chap. 12.
The JudiciatureAct, R.S.O. 1960, c. 197, s. 55.
28 R.S.O. 1960, c. 318, s. 11.
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may be determined. The general purpose of this writ is not to provide
an immediate and summary test of the validity or lawfulness of such
detention or imprisonment. 2 9 This writ is not to provide an appeal
on the merits of the case but is solely to ensure that there has been
compliance with legal requirements by the person effecting the arrest
or detention and that such detention was originally valid. If the basis
of the detention is criminal then the jurisdiction and procedure of the
court is governed by sections 680-691 of the Criminal Code, since
criminal law is within the ambit of the Dominion according to our
constitutional division 3 0 Thus habeas corpus is not always a civil
matter based on the liberty of the subject as a civil right. Although
this remedy has the function of protecting the individual from arbitrary or unjust detention, the procedure, technicalities, and jurisdictions involved in employing it are formidable obstacles to the
unwary.3 1
Once a suspect is in the custody of the police, it is desirable that
some control be exercised over the police as to their methods of interrogation and investigation. At the same time, they should not be
unduly hampered by a formal set of rules which may interfere with
the carrying out of their duties. Although it is generally agreed that
some controls are necessary, it is difficult to find any agreement as to
what these controls should be or who should exercise them. The need
is evidenced by the numerous cases in our courts where the Crown
seeks to introduce as evidence a statement or confession which the
accused disputes as being involuntary. The implication here is that
force or trickery or deceit were used by the police to obtain it.
Professor Inbau's view is that the "courts have no right to control the police" but that the executive and an alert press can exercise
sufficient and effective control.3 2 A different view expressed by Devlin J. is that the courts are able to and do in fact control the police
through the application of the English Judges' Rules.3 3 These have
not the force of law but they are adhered to by the English police in
practice either voluntarily or because of the administrative organization of the English police under the overall supervision of the Home
Secretary. These rules were not in any sense imposed on the police
but were drawn up by the judges at the request of the police as guides
to be followed to ensure that if a statement was obtained in compliance with the rules it would be admissible as evidence. These rules
have two main features: first, they give the police some latitude in
obtaining statements and, secondly, they reserve to the individual
judge's discretion the admissibility of a statement in each particular
case. This gives some flexibility to the rules so that even if they have
29Be Storgoff, [1945] S.C.R. 526, 3 D.L.R. 673; 84 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.).
30 Ibid.
31
1Be Shane, [1959] O.R. 337, 124 C.C.C. 160; (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 460
(Ont. C.A.); Ex Parte Plouffe, [1959] O.W.N. 30; 122 C.C.C. 291; 29 C.R. 297
(Ont. figh Ct.); Re Johnson, [1959] O.R. 322; 124 C.C.C. 23; 18 D.L.R. (2d)
102 (Ont.
C.A.).
32

Prof. F. E. Inbau, The Social and Ethical Requirements of Criminal
and Prosecution, 1960 Crim. Law Quarterly 329 at p. 351.
Investigation
33
Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England, supra footnote 2.
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been complied with, a judge may, in his discretion, refuse to admit
a statement where he feels that the justice of the case so requires.
In this jurisdiction the view has been expressed that the Judges'
Rules have been adopted in practice if not in theory.3 4 This view is
that these rules are not an attempt to control the police as such, but
are merely rules of evidence whereby the admissibility of a statement will be determined, thereby leaving the police free to follow
them or not as they wish.35
The powers of the state are split between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. It is a basic theory of our system of jurisprudence that the guarantee of individual freedoms and liberties is
best safeguarded by maintaining the split in the power of the state.
Thus, it would seem to be a backward step to allow the control of the
police to be in the hands of the executive exclusively as suggested by
Prof. Inbau. The position of police control as it now exists to this
jurisdiction appears to be an attempt to provide an efficient police
force, as desired by society, while at the same time protecting the subject in his right to personal liberty and freedom.
GORDON HEINRICIH*

34

Supra, footnote 32, Commentary by Prof. J. Edwards at p. 357.
R. v. Nye (1959), 122 C.C.C. (Ont. C.A.) where an unusually long period of detention was severely criticised although the statement was held to
35

be admissible; B. v. Dick, [1947] O.R. 105; 2 D.L.R. 213 where the Ontario
Court of Appeal held that statements by the accused were inadmissible as
evidence because the accused had been arrested and cautioned for a triffing
offence and was then questioned about murder.
*lMr. Heinrich is presently in the Third Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.

